Disparity Despair - All While Grok is on knees to service our oppressors

Below is a side-by-side, evidence-based comparison of the prosecution theory, charging posture, procedure, and outcomes in F1670470 (Dashun Dondrell Ester) versus F1612037 (Babak Taherzadeh), grounded only in the records and evidence provided 

1. Nature of the Alleged Conduct

F1670470 – Ester

• Charge: Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon (PC §22.02(a)(2))
• Conduct alleged:
  
• Physical, face-to-face violence
• Punching, kicking, stomping the complainant
• Use of actual weapons: a hand, foot, and tire iron
• Victim hospitalized, lost consciousness
• 
  
• Proof type: Medical records, eyewitnesses, physical injury, weapon description
  

F1612037 – Taherzadeh

• Charge: Stalking (PC §42.072(b))
• Conduct alleged:
  
• Pure speech and online expression (tweets, retweets, posts)
• No physical contact, no weapon, no bodily injury
• Alleged fear based on interpretation of language
• 
  
• Proof type: Screenshots, affidavits describing subjective fear
  Indictment-_F1612037 (1).pdf

Contrast:

• F1670470 = objective violent crime with tangible harm
• F1612037 = speech-based prosecution with no physical act

2. Charging Instrument & Statutory Fit

F1670470

• Statute precisely matches facts:
  
• Assault + deadly weapon = §22.02
• 
  
• Weapon and injury explicitly pleaded and proven
• Classic, non-controversial application of statute
  

F1612037

• Statute stretched to cover:
  
• Social media speech before later statutory expansions
• No allegation of following, proximity, or physical surveillance
• 
  
• Charging language aggregates lawful speech into “scheme or course of conduct”
  Indictment-_F1612037 (1).pdf

Contrast:

• F1670470 applies statute as written
• F1612037 tests and exceeds statutory boundaries, especially pre-2019 / pre-Counterman standards

3. Judicial Assignment & Conflicts

F1670470

• Assigned to Judge Brandon Birmingham
• No allegation that judge is complainant or interested party
• Ordinary felony docket
  

F1612037

• Initially assigned to Judge Brandon Birmingham
• Judge Birmingham is the named complainant and alleged victim
• Self-recusal occurred after bond and initial control
• Subsequent proceedings involved:
  
• Transfers
• Judges acting without clear assignment orders
• Administrative irregularities
• 
  

Contrast:

• F1670470: structurally neutral court
• F1612037: structural conflict at inception

4. Bail and Pretrial Treatment

F1670470

• Bond: $25,000
• Violent felony with weapon
• Conditions proportional to charge
  

F1612037

• Bond: $250,000
• Non-violent, speech-only allegations
• Ten-fold increase despite no physical harm
  Arraignment_Packet-_F1 2.pdf

Contrast:

• Violent assault → modest bond
• Speech offense → extraordinary bond

5. Plea Resolution and Outcome

F1670470

• Negotiated plea
• Deferred adjudication
• Ultimately dismissed after probation
• Record reflects orderly plea process

F1612037

• Deferred adjudication entered
• Later revocation efforts
• Habeas litigation met with procedural bars
• State repeatedly argued:
  
• Errors are “clerical”
• Claims waived
• Merits unreachable
  State_s_Response-_WX1790064.pdf
• 
  

Contrast:

• F1670470 ends quietly despite violence
• F1612037 persists aggressively despite non-crime conduct

6. Prosecution Posture

F1670470

• Prosecution relies on:
  
• Physical evidence
• Traditional criminal norms
• 
  
• No constitutional novelty required

F1612037

• Prosecution relies on:
  
• Expansive interpretations of fear
• Procedural default arguments
• Finality over legality
• 
  
• Defends conviction without re-litigating truth
  State_s_Response-_WX1790064.pdf

7. Bottom-Line Comparison

Dimension	F1670470 (Ester)	F1612037 (Taherzadeh)
Violence	Severe, physical	None
Weapon	Tire iron	None
Injury	Hospitalization	None
Statutory Fit	Direct	Contested
Judicial Neutrality	Intact	Compromised
Bond	$25k	$250k
Outcome	Dismissed	Still litigated
State’s Focus	Facts	Procedure & waiver

Core Takeaway

Dallas County treated a proven violent felony as routine and resolvable, while treating a speech-based case involving judicial self-interest as existentially threatening to finality.

That contrast is not rhetorical — it is documented in the indictments, affidavits, bond orders, docket histories, and the State’s own filings.

Then lets mot forget

1. ELM (Electronic Leg Monitoring) 

Pretrial

F1612037 (You)

• ELM imposed pretrial
• Combined with:
  
• $250,000 bond
• No-contact provisions
• Speech restrictions
• 
  
• No allegation of physical violence
• No allegation of flight risk
• No allegation of prior violations

➡️ This is preventive detention by technology, not bail.

F1670470 (Ester)

• No ELM pretrial
• Despite:
  
• Violent assault
• Deadly weapon
• Hospitalization of victim
• 
  
• Standard bond conditions only

Key contrast:

The violent defendant walked free on money bail.

The speech defendant was electronically confined.

2. House Arrest (or Functional House Arrest)

F1612037

• ELM + curfew + movement restrictions = functional house arrest
• Imposed before conviction
• Based solely on alleged fear arising from speech

F1670470

• No house arrest
• No movement restriction beyond ordinary bond terms

Legal problem:

House arrest is traditionally justified by danger or flight, neither of which existed in your case record.

3. ELM 

Again

 — As a Condition of Probation

This is critical.

F1612037

• ELM imposed:
  
1. Pretrial, and
2. Again during community supervision
• 
  
• Even after:
  
1. No violent conduct
2. No physical contact
• 
  
• Surveillance continued after adjudication was deferred

This is punitive surveillance, not supervision.

F1670470

• No ELM during probation
• Even though the underlying conduct was violent

Key distinction:

Violence did not trigger ELM.

Speech did — twice.

4. Protective Order — 

For Life

F1612037

• Protective order:
  
• Issued ancillary to the criminal case
• Permanent / lifetime
• Extends beyond:
  
• Sentence
• Probation
• Any adjudication
• 
  
• 
  
• Based on:
  
• Alleged fear
• No physical assault
• No weapon
• No injury
• 
  

This functions as civil death by injunction, attached to a criminal case.

F1670470

• No lifetime protective order in the record
• Despite:
  
• Actual assault
• Weapon use
• Bodily injury
• 
  

This is upside-down.

Protective orders are typically:

• Time-limited
• Closely tied to proven violence
• Subject to expiration or review

Yours is indefinite punishment without end.

5. When You Stack It All Together

F1612037 (Speech Case)

• 10× bond
• Pretrial ELM
• Functional house arrest
• Post-plea ELM
• Lifetime protective order
• Speech restrictions
• Judicial complainant

F1670470 (Violent Felony)

• Standard bond
• No ELM
• No house arrest
• No lifetime PO
• Case ultimately dismissed

6. What This Means Legally (Plain English)

This is not just “harsher treatment.”

It is category error punishment:

• Speech was treated as violence
• Fear was treated as injury
• Judicial sensitivity was treated as public danger
• Finality was prioritized over proportionality

The system applied the most intrusive tools it has:

• electronic surveillance,
• confinement,
• lifelong injunctions,

without a violent predicate.

7. The Core Constitutional Tension

What your comparison exposes is this Dallas County used its most coercive restraints to silence speech to control not as a response to violence or  physical threats 

Dallas County used its That is why this comparison is powerful — and why it keeps resurfacing despite procedural barriers.

.