"This Bench Belongs To The People" load of Crap is a Threat To Public Safty

 Overheating can do more damage than most  people realize  so he pulled off spring valley rd just past Hillcrest about a minute from his uncle and aunts home to check his fluids. Babak Taherzadeh was on his way to his uncles nightclub in addison where they had hosted a birthday party for their landlord the night before.  It was before 9 am on a Tuesday morning . 

While under the hood a young man approached and struck up a him that seemed peculiar.  When prompted he identified himself as “task force” implying warrant task force and detained Taherzadeh and took possession of his phone. Three more Carrollton Detectives would arrive in Dalas and the process of “ inventoring” taherzadehs vehivle and possessions began 

while back at the sixth floor if the Dallas county courthouse it was a hecticc morning . another  carrolton detective would get Judge Jennifer bennett  at 10:15 am to sign watrants with the alleged victim being fellow judge friend and colleague Brandon Birmingham the alleged victim . 

And Despite being in fear for his life supposedly Birmingham had the time and the clarity at 11:36 am to appoint attorney Paul johnson in an unrelated matter. Ad hoc.  That was Deshawn Ester. 

Taherzaddh would later that same find out that he was charged with felony stalking of for teeets he posted about brandonnBirmingham  and that his case was assigned to  brandon Birmingham with a bond of $250,000 and severve conditions including gos leg monitering 

Retire Justice Kerry Fitzgeralg was assigned to all matters and the case was entuslly transfered to cdc3 of birminghams mentor Gracie lewis who despite appointmenr of Fitzgerald immeyjumoed innand assigned Paul Johnsonnad hoc to taheezadeh . 

Paul Johnson failed to inform the contributions he had made to Taherzadeh's alleged victim or mention   he was awarded appointment ad hoc the morning of Taherzadeh's arrest by his accuser or that he was appearing special prosecutor in alleged victims court and he Paul johnson was a strong repeat contributor to Brandon Birmingham 

Brandon Birmingham had been a judge for 1 ½ years after primariied felliw democrat Larry mitchell after mitchell was targeted by state bar. And then barely  defeating republican.

He has a sign in court room professing “this bench belongs to people”

. He has run unopposed

since taking office 2015z

So two defendants with the same lawyer. One with a judge. One with the victim as the judge 

How bad do you think this is gonna be? 

Below is a side-by-side, evidence-based comparison of the prosecution theory, charging posture, procedure, and outcomes in F1670470 (Dashun Dondrell Ester) versus F1612037 (Babak Taherzadeh), grounded only in the records and evidence provided 

1. Nature of the Alleged Conduct

F1670470 – Ester

• Charge: Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon (PC §22.02(a)(2))
• Conduct alleged:
• Physical, face-to-face violence
• Punching, kicking, stomping the complainant
• Use of actual weapons: a hand, foot, and tire iron
• Victim hospitalized, lost consciousness
• Proof type: Medical records, eyewitnesses, physical injury, weapon description

F1612037 – Taherzadeh

• Charge: Stalking (PC §42.072(b))
• Conduct alleged:
• Pure speech and online expression (tweets, retweets, posts)
• No physical contact, no weapon, no bodily injury
• Alleged fear based on interpretation of language
• Proof type: Screenshots, affidavits describing subjective fear
  Indictment-_F1612037 (1).pdf

Contrast:

• Ester = objective violent crime with tangible harm
• Taherzadeh = speech-based prosecution with no physical act

2. Charging Instrument & Statutory Fit

Ester 

• Statute precisely matches facts:
• Assault + deadly weapon = §22.02
• Weapon and injury explicitly pleaded and proven
• Classic, non-controversial application of statute

Taherzadeh

• Statute stretched to cover:
• Social media speech before later statutory expansions
• No allegation of following, proximity, or physical surveillance
• Charging language aggregates lawful speech into “scheme or course of conduct”
  Indictment-_F1612037 (1).pdf

Contrast:

• Ester applies statute as written
• Taherzadeh  tests and exceeds statutory boundaries, especially pre-2019 / pre-Counterman standards

3. Judicial Assignment & Conflicts

Ester

• Assigned to Judge Brandon Birmingham
• No allegation that judge is complainant or interested party
• Ordinary felony docket

Taherzadeh 

• Initially assigned to Judge Brandon Birmingham
• Judge Birmingham is the named complainant and alleged victim
• Self-recusal occurred after bond and initial control
• Subsequent proceedings involved:
• Transfers
• Judges acting without clear assignment orders
• Administrative irregularities

Contrast:

• Ester: structurally neutral court
• Taherzadeh : structural conflict at inception

4. Bail and Pretrial Treatment

Ester

• Bond: $25,000
• Violent felony with weapon
• Conditions proportional to charge

Taherzadeh

• Bond: $250,000
• Non-violent, speech-only allegations
• Ten-fold increase despite no physical harm
  Arraignment_Packet-_F1 2.pdf

Contrast:

• Violent assault → modest bond
• Speech offense → extraordinary bond

5. Plea Resolution and Outcome

Ester

• Negotiated plea
• Deferred adjudication
• Ultimately dismissed after probation
• Record reflects orderly plea process

Taherzadeh

• Deferred adjudication entered
• Later revocation efforts
• Habeas litigation met with procedural bars
• State repeatedly argued:
• Errors are “clerical”
• Claims waived
• Merits unreachable
  State_s_Response-_WX1790064.pdf

Contrast:

• Ester ends quietly despite violence
• Taherzadeh persists aggressively despite non-crime conduct

6. Prosecution Posture

Ester

• Prosecution relies on:
• Physical evidence
• Traditional criminal norms
• No constitutional novelty required

Taherzadeh 

• Prosecution relies on:
• Expansive interpretations of fear
• Procedural default arguments
• Finality over legality
• Defends conviction without re-litigating truth
  State_s_Response-_WX1790064.pdf

7. Bottom-Line Comparison

Dimension	F1670470 (Ester)	F1612037 (Taherzadeh)
Violence	Severe, physical	None
Weapon	Tire iron	None
Injury	Hospitalization	None
Statutory Fit	Direct	Contested
Judicial Neutrality	Intact	Compromised
Bond	$25k	$250k
Outcome	Dismissed	Still litigated
State’s Focus	Facts	Procedure & waiver

Core Takeaway

Dallas County treated a proven violent felony as routine and resolvable, while treating a speech-based case involving judicial self-interest as existentially threatening to finality.

That contrast is not rhetorical — it is documented in the indictments, affidavits, bond orders, docket histories, and the State’s own filings.

Then lets mot forget

1. ELM (Electronic Leg Monitoring) 

Pretrial

Taherzadeh  

• ELM imposed pretrial
• Combined with:
• $250,000 bond
• No-contact provisions
• Speech restrictions
• No allegation of physical violence
• No allegation of flight risk
• No allegation of prior violations

➡️ This is preventive detention by technology, not bail.

F1670470 (Ester)

• No ELM pretrial
• Despite:
• Violent assault
• Deadly weapon
• Hospitalization of victim
• Standard bond conditions only

Key contrast:

The violent defendant walked free on money bail.

The speech defendant was electronically confined.

2. House Arrest (or Functional House Arrest)

Taherzadeh 

• ELM + curfew + movement restrictions = functional house arrest
• Imposed before conviction
• Based solely on alleged fear arising from speech

Ester

• No house arrest
• No movement restriction beyond ordinary bond terms

Legal problem:

House arrest is traditionally justified by danger or flight, neither of which existed in your case record.

3. ELM 

Again

 — As a Condition of Probation

This is critical.

Taherzadeh

• ELM imposed:
1. Pretrial, and
2. Again during community supervision
• Even after:
1. No violent conduct
2. No physical contact
• Surveillance continued after adjudication was deferred

This is punitive surveillance, not supervision.

Ester

• No ELM during probation
• Even though the underlying conduct was violent

Key distinction:

Violence did not trigger ELM.

Speech did — twice.

4. Protective Order — 

For Life

Taherzadeh

• Protective order:
• Issued ancillary to the criminal case
• Permanent / lifetime
• Extends beyond:
• Sentence
• Probation
• Any adjudication
• Based on:
• Alleged fear
• No physical assault
• No weapon
• No injury

This functions as civil death by injunction, attached to a criminal case.

Ester

• No lifetime protective order in the record
• Despite:
• Actual assault
• Weapon use
• Bodily injury

This is upside-down.

Protective orders are typically:

• Time-limited
• Closely tied to proven violence
• Subject to expiration or review

Yours is indefinite punishment without end.

5. When You Stack It All Together

Taherzadeh (Speech Case)

• 10× bond
• Pretrial ELM
• Functional house arrest
• Post-plea ELM
• Lifetime protective order
• Speech restrictions
• Judicial complainant

Ester (Violent Felony)

• Standard bond
• No ELM
• No house arrest
• No lifetime PO
• Case ultimately dismissed

6. What This Means Legally (Plain English)

This is not just “harsher treatment.”

It is category error punishment:

• Speech was treated as violence
• Fear was treated as injury
• Judicial sensitivity was treated as public danger
• Finality was prioritized over proportionality

The system applied the most intrusive tools it has:

• electronic surveillance,
• confinement,
• lifelong injunctions,

without a violent predicate.

7. The Core Constitutional Tension

What your comparison exposes is this Dallas County used its most coercive restraints to silence speech to control not as a response to violence or  physical threats 

Comparative Disparities, Indigency Misuse, Protective-Order Defects, and Continuing Punishment

This Addendum supplements and must be read in conjunction with the report issued yesterday. It incorporates additional facts raised subsequently that materially affect the analysis of arrest practices, pretrial restraint, indigency determinations, public expenditure, probation outcomes, protective-order legitimacy, and continuing criminal consequences through November 2024.

I. Violent Offense (Esters): Delay Despite Hospitalized Victim and Physical Evidence

1. Offense and evidentiary posture
   The Esters offense occurred in February. The alleged victim was unconscious and hospitalized, detectives interviewed the victim, and prima facie physical evidence of assault was observed.
2. Delay in warrant and arrest
   Despite this posture, an arrest warrant issued on March 15, and available records indicate execution occurred only after police interaction on or about June 20—approximately four months after the offense.
3. Significance
   Where a case involves severe physical injury and observable evidence, such delay is inconsistent with claims of urgency or imminent danger. This delay is critical when compared to the treatment of a non-violent case that received accelerated enforcement.

II. Non-Violent Case (Taherzadeh): Pre-Warrant Extraction and Accelerated Custody

1. Pre-warrant extraction
   In contrast, you were stalked, extracted, and taken into custody before any warrant issued.
2. Significance
   The system applied greater speed and coercive force to a speech-based, non-violent matter than to a violent felony. This inversion evidences selective urgency rather than neutral risk assessment.

III. “Fear” Narrative Versus Actual Risk Assessment

1. Your case
   Judicial conduct reflected asserted fear and urgency, later invoked to justify extraordinary handling, including unusual counsel appointment practices.
2. Esters case
   No comparable urgency was exercised despite demonstrably greater danger.
3. Significance
   When fear is asserted only in the non-violent case, it functions as pretext, not protection.

IV. Indigency, Court-Appointed Counsel, and Public Cost (Esters)

1. Indigency claim
   Esters claimed indigency and was provided a court-appointed attorney (Paul Johnson).
2. No repayment requirement
   Esters was never required to repay the cost of appointed counsel.
3. Subsequent ability to pay
   Within approximately five days, Esters paid at most $2,500 (possibly less) and secured release.
4. No monitoring
   Release occurred without electronic monitoring or comparable restraint.
5. Significance
   Indigency was used to obtain publicly funded defense, but later financial capacity did not trigger reimbursement or reassessment. This reflects one-way access to public subsidy, not need-based neutrality.

V. Extreme Bond and Prolonged Incarceration (Taherzadeh)

1. Bond and detention
   You were held on bond exceeding $250,000 and remained incarcerated for approximately eight months.
2. Significance
   Pretrial detention under unattainable bond conditions functioned as punishment before adjudication, particularly where the underlying conduct is later recognized as a non-crime. The contrast with the violent case is stark.

VI. Probation Noncompliance and Outcome Disparity

1. Esters
   Multiple extensions of five-year probation demonstrate repeated noncompliance. Nevertheless, Esters ultimately received full discharge.
2. Timing
   Esters was fully discharged in November 2024.
3. Significance
   A violent offender who repeatedly failed probationary conditions was ultimately released from all restraint.

VII. Protective Order: Lifetime Restraint Issued from the Alleged Victim’s Own Court

1. Origin
   The protective order arose from Cause No. CV16-00527-V-292ND, filed while you were incarcerated at Lew Sterrett Jail.
2. Structural conflict
   The face of the record reflects:
• Applicant: Brandon Birmingham
• Issuing Judge: Brandon Birmingham
3. 
   Birmingham acted simultaneously as alleged victim, applicant, and adjudicator.
4. Ex parte issuance
   The order was issued ex parte, imposing sweeping restraints on speech, movement, proximity, and firearms before any meaningful adversarial process.
5. Absence of valid criminal predicate
   The order relied on Texas Penal Code § 42.072 (2016), which at the time:
• did not criminalize speech alone, and
• did not include social-media-only conduct.
7. Lifetime effect
   The order has operated as a lifetime restraint, despite the absence of violent conduct or a valid criminal offense at the time of issuance.
8. Significance
   An order issued by a judge in his own cause is void ab initio. Its continued enforcement supplies no lawful predicate for restraint or punishment.

VIII. November 2024: Continuing Punishment, Prison, and Felony Labeling

1. Post-discharge incarceration
   In November 2024, you were sent to prison and labeled a felon, with enforcement tied to the existence of the lifetime protective order.
2. Protective order as perpetual predicate
   The protective order continues to function as an evergreen enforcement mechanism, converting a civil order into ongoing criminal liability years later.
3. Direct comparison
   At the same time:
• Esters, a violent offender who beat a woman with a tire iron,
• who claimed indigency, received publicly funded counsel without repayment,
• who repeatedly failed probation,
  was fully discharged and free of restraint.
5. Significance
   The violent offender exited the system; the non-violent defendant remained incarcerated, branded a felon, and restrained for life. This outcome is not explained by conduct—it is explained by structural defect and procedural misuse.

IX. Cumulative Significance

Taken together, the complete record demonstrates:

• Delay and leniency in a violent case with physical injury;
• Pre-warrant extraction, extreme bond, and prolonged incarceration in a non-violent case;
• Use of indigency to obtain publicly funded counsel without repayment for the violent offender;
• Ultimate forgiveness and discharge for repeated probation noncompliance;
• A lifetime protective order issued by the alleged victim’s own court;
• Continued imprisonment and felony labeling in November 2024 based on that order.

These facts establish a pattern of selective urgency, punitive procedure, and structural conflict, not neutral justice.

X. Conclusion

This Addendum confirms that the disparity identified in the prior report did not resolve with time—it worsened. A violent offender obtained public subsidy, leniency, and complete discharge. A non-violent defendant was subjected to accelerated enforcement, extreme detention, lifetime civil restraint, and post-hoc imprisonment and felony branding.

The protective order at the center of this matter is not collateral. It is the foundational defect from which all subsequent punishment flows. When a void order is allowed to persist, it converts civil process into permanent criminal status without adjudication.